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Abstract: Phishing (password + fishing) is a form of cyber crime based on social engineering and site 
spoofing techniques. The name of ‘phishing’ is a conscious misspelling of the word 'fishing' and involves 
stealing confidential data from a user’s computer and subsequently using the data to steal the user’s money.  
In this paper, we study, discuss and propose the phishing attack stages and types, technologies for detection 
of phishing web pages, and conclude our paper with some important recommendations for preventing 
phishing for both consumer and company. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, there is a huge variety of cyber 
threats that can be quite dangerous not 
only for big companies but also for 
ordinary user, who can be a potential 
victim for cybercriminals when using 
unsafe system for entering confidential 
data, such as login, password, credit card 
numbers, etc. Among popular computer 
threats it is possible to distinguish several 
types of them depending on the means and 
ways they are realized. They are: 
malicious software (malware), DDoS 
(Distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks, 
phishing, banking, exploiting 
vulnerabilities, botnets, threats for mobile 
phones, IP-communication threats, social 
networking threats and even spam. All of 
these threats try to violate one of the 
following criteria: confidentiality, integrity 
and accessibility. Lately, malicious 
software has turned into big business and 
cyber criminals became profitable 
organizations and able to perform any type 
of attack.  
Phishing is a current social engineering 
attack that results in online identity theft. 
In a phishing attack, the attacker persuades  
 
the victim to reveal confidential 
information by using web site spoofing 
techniques. Social engineering is one of 
the strongest weapons in the armory of 
hackers and malicious code writers, as it is 
much easier to trick someone into giving 
his or her password for a system than to 
spend the effort to hack in. By 2007 social 
engineering techniques became the 
number-one method used by insiders to 
commit e-crimes, but unsuspecting users 
remain the predominant conduit for the 
authors of malicious code [1, 2].  
It is unknown precisely how much 
phishing costs each year since impacted 
industries are reluctant to release figures; 
estimates range from US$1 billion to 2.8 
billion per year [3]. 
The rest of our paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 demonstrates the 
phishing attack stages and types. Section 
3. Technologies for detection of phishing 
web pages. In section 4, we give some 
affective recommendations strategies 
against phishing. Conclusions have been 
made in section 5. 
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2. PHISHING ATTACK STAGES AND 
TYPES 
Generally, social engineering malware 
reproduces through a variety of channels, 
including e-mail, social software, websites, 
portable storage devices, and mobile 
devices. There are several different ways 
of trying to drive users to a fake web site: 
• Spam e-mail, spoofed to look like 
correspondence from a legitimate 
financial institution.  
• Hostile profiling, a targeted version of 
the above method: the cyber criminal 
exploits web sites that use e-mail 
addresses for user registration or 
password reminders and directs the 
phishing scam at specific users (asking 
them to confirm passwords, etc.).  
• Install a Trojan that edits the hosts 
file, so that when the victim tries to 
browse to their bank‟s web site, they 
are re-directed to the fake site.  
• ‘Spear phishing’, an attack on a 
specific organization in which the 
phisher simply asks for one employee‟s 
details and uses them to gain wider 
access to the rest of the network. For 
traditional phishing sites, removing 
either the hosting website or the 
domain (if only used for phishing) is 
sufficient to remove a phishing site.    
Traditional type of phishing attack is 
shown on Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Traditional attack 
Not all phishing attacks work in the 
manner just described. The „rock-phish‟ 
gang3 has adapted its attack strategy to 
evade detection and maximize phishing-
site availability. It has separated out the 
elements of the attack while adding 
redundancy in the face of take-down 
requests.  
The gang first purchases a number of 
domain names with short, generally 
meaningless, names such as lof80.info. The 
email spam then contains a long URL such 
as http://www.bank.com.id123.lof80.info/vr 
where the first part of the URL is intended 
to make the site appear genuine and a 
mechanism such as `wildcard DNS‟ can be 
used to resolve all such variants to a 
particular IP address.  
It then maps each of the domain names to a 
dynamic pool of compromised machines 
according to a gang-controlled name 
server. Each compromised machine runs a 
proxy system that relays requests to a back-
end server system. This server is loaded 
with a large number (up to 20 at a time) of 
fake bank websites, all of which are 
available from any of the rock-phish 
machines. However, which bank site is 
reached depends solely upon the URL-
path, after the first „/‟. (Because the gang 
uses proxies, the real servers – that hold all 
the web pages and collate the stolen 
information – can be located almost 
anywhere.)  
According to statistic presented by 
InfoSecurity more than 50% of all 
PhishTank reports are categorized as rock-
phish (see Figure 2). Rock-phish domains 
and IPs also last longer than ordinary 
phishing sites: rockphish domains last for 
95 hours on average while rock IPs last 
172 hours, compared to 62 hours for 
regular phishing sites. These longer 
lifetimes occur despite impersonating 
around 20 banks simultaneously, which 
should draw the attention of more banks. 
One explanation for the longer lifetimes is 
that their attack method is not widely 
understood, leading to sluggish responses. 
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Splitting up the components of the 
phishing attack (domains, compromised 
machines and hosting servers) obfuscates 
the phishing behavior so that each 
individual decision maker (the domain 
registrar, ISP system administrator) cannot 
recognize the nature of the attack as easily 
when an impersonated domain name is 
used (such as barclaysbankk.com), or 
HTML for a bank site is found in a hidden 
sub-directory on a hijacked machine.   
 
Figure 2.  Rock-phish attack 
Further innovation by the gang dubbed 
„fast-flux‟ by the anti-phishing community 
(see Figure 3). It arranged for its domains 
to resolve to a set of five IP addresses for a 
short period, then switched to another five. 
This of course „eats up‟ many hundreds of 
IP addresses a week (4572 addresses 
during our eight-week collection period), 
but the agility makes it almost entirely 
impractical to „take down‟ the hosting 
machines. The gang is likely to have large 
numbers of compromised machines 
available (probably in the form of botnets), 
since if they are not used to serve up 
phishing websites, they are available for 
sending email spam. Fast-flux IP addresses 
remained alive for 139 hours on average, 
slightly less time than for rock-phish IPs. 
This is likely a reflection of the nature of 
the compromised hosts – consumer 
machines with dynamic IP address 
assignment – since the sites were not 
actively taken down. Domains were very 
long-lived (252 hours on average). This is 
because many fast-flux sites were not 
actually phishing sites at all. Instead, many 
were hosting mule-recruitment sites or 
selling diet pills and Viagra. 
 
Figure 3. Fast-flux attacks 
 
3. TECHNOLOGIES FOR 
DETECTION OF PHISHING 
WEBPAGES 
Many anti-phishing solutions have been 
proposed to date. Some approaches 
attempt to solve the phishing problem at 
the e-mail level. Obviously, such 
techniques are closely related to anti-spam 
research. In fact, anti-spam techniques 
have proven to be quite effective in also 
intercepting phishing e-mails. 
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of anti-
spam techniques often depends on many 
critical factors such as regular filter 
training and the availability of anti-spam 
tools and are currently not used by the 
majority of Internet users. 
Well-known solutions in literature are 
SpoofGuard [4-6] and PwdHash [7-10]. 
SpoofGuard looks for phishing symptoms 
(e.g., obfuscated URLS) in web pages and 
raises alerts. Pwd-Hash, in contrast, 
creates domain-specific passwords that are 
rendered useless if they are submitted to 
another domain (e.g., a password for 
www.gmail.com  will be different if 
submitted to www.attacker.com).  
AntiPhish tool [11] takes a different 
approach and keeps track of where 
sensitive in-formation is being submitted. 
That is, if it detects that confidential 
information such as a password is being 
entered into a form on an untrusted web 
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site, a warning is generated and the 
pending operation is canceled. 
An interesting solution that has been 
proposed by Dhamija et al. [5] involves 
the use of a so-called dynamic security 
skin on the user‟s browser. The technique  
allows a remote server to prove its identity 
in a way that is easy for humans to verify, 
but difficult for phishers to spoof. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that it 
requires effort by the user. That is, the user 
needs to be aware of the 
phishing threat and check for signs that the 
site he is visiting is spoofed.  
The most popular and widely-deployed 
techniques, however, are based on the use 
of blacklists of phishing domains that the 
browser refuses to visit [12-15].  
4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this section, we give some 
recommendations for phishing protection: 
4.1 For a Company: 
 Create corporate policies for E-mail 
content so that legitimate E-mail 
cannot be confused with phishing. 
 Provide a right way and stronger 
authentication at web sites for the 
consumer to validate that the received 
E-mail is legitimate. 
 Monitor the Internet for potential 
phishing web sites and implement 
good quality of anti-virus to filter and 
block known phishing sites at the 
gateway. 
4.2 For a Consumer: 
 Automatically block malicious E-mail 
by implementing Spam detectors 
which can help to keep the consumer 
from ever opening the suspicious E-
mail. 
 Automatically detect and delete 
malicious software and spyware by 
installing any of specialized 
commercial programs. 
 Moreover, we recommend a 
combination of countermeasures that 
will minimize the number of phishing 
attacks delivered to consumers; 
increase the likelihood that the 
consumer will recognize a phishing 
attack; and minimize the opportunities 
for the consumer to inadvertently 
release sensitive information. 
 Finally, education remains critical so 
consumers are aware of both the 
phishing techniques and how 
legitimate entities will communicate 
with them via E-mail and the web. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Con artists have been around for centuries, 
but E-mail and the World Wide Web 
provide them with the tools to reach 
thousands or millions of potential victims 
in minutes at almost no expense. With 
phishing attacks, con artists must still gain 
the consumer‟s confidence to be 
successful. So, the final technical solution 
to phishing involves significant 
infrastructure changes in the Internet that 
are beyond the ability of any one 
institution to deploy. However, there are 
many steps, as we mentioned, that can be 
taken to reduce the consumer‟s 
vulnerability to phishing attacks.  
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